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Abstract
Regulators and shareholders are calling for independent directors. Independent
directors, however, have numerous external professional commitments. Using To-
bin’s Q as an approximation of market valuation and controlling for endogeneity, our
empirical analysis reveals that neither external commitments are negatively related
to firm performance nor is independence positively related to it. However, more
precise analyses show that executive directors and family representatives have a
positive relationship with Tobin’s Q. In contrast, external executives are negatively
correlated with firm valuation. Moreover, the study indicates that the frequency and
duration of meetings are negatively affected by the fraction of executive directors on
the board. Insiders potentially reduce the need for meetings because of their special-
ist competence. The results invalidate rules advocating independent directors and
oppose the engagement of directors with external commitments.
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Most economists agree that a board of directors’ essential duty is to ensure that a
company is led in the shareholders’ best interests. The board of directors is positioned
between a company’s top management and its shareholders who have typically insuffi-
cient ownership to influence firm policies. Two important responsibilities of the board of
directors are monitoring and advising top management. The first task, which is rooted in
agency theory, stresses the importance of the director’s role in solving the principal-agent
conflict between managers and shareholders (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and
Jensen, 1983). In this context, the board’s "independence" from management is crucial.
The second task emphasizes the importance of the director’s role providing ties with
the external business environment and professional specialist skills (e.g., strategic plan-
ning). This latter responsibility is associated with external commitments of directors and
is based on resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). These two roles are
subject to trade-offs.
The first trade-off relates to the position (or independence) of the board vis-à-vis the
top management. Board directors need sufficient information about the daily business of
the company to do a proper job. The information asymmetry between the management
and the board directors can be reduced by continuing communication of the two parties.
Executive directors (insiders) can close this gap. However, a close relationship, friend-
ship or even dependence on the chief executive officer (CEO) and his executive board can
impair the board’s independence and lead to collusion and conflicts of interest.
For instance, compromised board decisions may involve executives being replaced
too late or paid too much, counter to shareholder interests (Adams and Ferreira, 2007).
This is particularly difficult where the CEO has a lot of decision-making power as in the
nomination of new directors (see Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). In addition, insiders
virtually supervise themselves. As a consequence of these potential imbalances, the in-
fluential Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 requires that a company’s audit committee
be composed of independent directors.1 Also the Swiss Code of Best Practice for Cor-
porate Governance proposes that boards consist of a majority of non-executive directors
(Economiesuisse, 2008).
Academics as well as regulators apply specific principles defining board indepen-
dence. The economic literature traditionally classifies board members as insiders and
outsiders (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Executive directors are commonly defined
as being insiders, while non-executive directors are denominated as being outsiders.
1See SOX Section 301(m)(3)(A): "In general — Each member of the audit committee of the issuer shall
be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be independent." This direct and
exogenous impact led to a reduction of insiders on U.S. boards of unregulated firms from 2001 to 2004
(see Linck et al., 2008). Especially small firms with traditionally higher proportions of insiders lowered
their rate. Few firms had insider-dominated boards by 2004. Also, board sizes increased due to a higher
complexity and requirements of the board.
2
Nevertheless, not all of these outsiders are independent. Such directors are often re-
ferred to as "gray" or "affiliated" directors. As a common rule, directors are considered
independent if they are not currently employed by the firm or if a gap of three years has
elapsed since previous employment there, and if they have neither financial nor business
ties to the corporation (see Economiesuisse, 2008).2
The second trade-off is characterized by time constraints imposed by competing al-
legiances and conflicts of interest imposed by competing commitments, which, however,
may provide benefits of business experience and external linkages. The call for indepen-
dent directors launched in the United States has led to the appointment of directors who
have neither financial nor personnel relations to the firm. As a matter of fact, the frac-
tion of such independent directors has risen from 22 percent to 73 percent in the period
from 1950 until 2005 in the United States (Gordon, 2007). Accordingly, the fraction of
inside directors or gray directors has decreased to 16 and 11 percent, respectively. In
consequence, independent "professional" directors may accumulate a significant number
of other external mandates, assuming that a directorship is generally not a full-time
job. On the one hand, these external engagements may reduce the time allocated to
any single directorship. This, in turn, reduces their monitoring capacity and potentially
exacerbates the agency problem, raising the agency costs that they were employed to
reduce in the first place. On the other hand, experienced directors with multiple man-
dates provide important linkages to the external environment. In addition, with mul-
tiple directorships, directors are not uniquely financially dependent on one single seat
for remuneration, thus allowing them more scope to voice their views independently in
discussions in the board room (see Schiltknecht, 2009). Such factors may facilitate busi-
ness in uncertain economic environments. All the same, increasingly governance codes
recommend restricting the number of external directorships, as is the case in France or
the Netherlands (AFG (2010) and CGCMC (2008)).
In light of regulations and shareholders calling for board independence and a limita-
tion to the number external mandates adopted, the question arises whether such rules
improve the effectiveness of the board and as a result, the value of all firms on average.
Hence, the examination of these questions has policy implications. A legislation amend-
ment that only improves the governance of specific firms (e.g., large and international
banks) may adversely affect and seriously burden other firms. Inappropriate rules re-
strict the freedom of firms to organize their board structure according to their needs in
2In addition, non-independence can also apply to directors with relations to significant shareholders
or directors with a long tenure (see AFEP-MEDEF, 2008). Firms may also employ additional indepen-
dence criteria. For instance, the Swiss UBS has 13 independence criteria based on the Corporate Gov-
ernance Listing Standards of the New York Stock Exchange for board members and 16 for members
of the audit committee (http://www.ubs.com/1/g/investors/corporategovernance/independencecriteria.html,
access on 21/02/2011).
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a value-maximizing manner. In short, corporate governance reforms are only beneficial
and welfare-improving if the net-effect over all firms is positive.
Therefore, a problem in modern boards lies in the trade-off between the indepen-
dence and the commitment of external directors. Current research on the topic fails to
explicitly connect independence with external commitments. Some do so implicitly by
investigating the impact of heavily committed outsiders on firm performance (Ferris et
al., 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Furthermore, studies use broad proxies for either
independence or outside commitment. And finally, most academic papers focus on the
U.S. market where ownership is dispersed, requirements for independent directors exi-
gent, and a large pool of directors available.
We address the two issues (independence and external commitment) and examine
their effect on firm performance in Switzerland. Swiss firms are an interesting research
object for two reasons. Firstly, the legislature allows executives to occupy positions on
the board of directors, as is the case in market-oriented governance systems, which are
elected by the general assembly ("one-tier board structure"). Thus, a board can consist
of executive directors (insiders), as well as outsiders, and the leadership structure can
also be combined (where the CEO is also chairman).3 The Swiss one-tier board structure
contrasts the two-tiered board system stipulated in Germany (and other continental Eu-
ropean countries) which strictly separates the supervisory board ("Aufsichtsrat") from
the management board ("Vorstand"). Furthermore, the supervisory board in the Ger-
man case consists, depending on firm size, partly of representatives of the employees. In
a dualistic system, no variance in board composition relating to executive directors can
be observed, and consequently, empirical investigations are not possible. In Switzerland
such examinations are feasible.
Secondly, the narrow or illiquid market for directors generates low supply of direc-
tors. Supply meets demand for the high-profile directorships of many large corporations
headquartered in Switzerland. This can lead to close networks of business leaders who
meet on several occasions and form a "culture de l’entre-soi". The so-called "old boys
network" is and has been an issue in Switzerland (further information on Swiss particu-
larities can be found in the Appendix, Section .1 and Section .2).
3One-tier boards are prevalent in economies that are meant to have an active takeover market and
diffuse ownership (particularly the United States). In Anglo-Saxon countries, the board may play a role
that is different to non-Anglo-Saxon countries due to differences in the relationship between the top man-
agement and shareholders (Gillan et al., 2007; Franks et al., 2001). Nevertheless, please note that most
European countries (e.g., France and Italy) have flexible rules regarding the structure of boards. In our
case, Switzerland has a strong financial market; however, the market for corporate control is not important
and the ownership is rather concentrated. Hence, classical board independence may not be a critical factor
in this situation where fewer conflicts of interest exist between the management and the shareholders in
general.
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Our study uses a host of refined variables to measure independence (12 variables)
and external commitments (12 variables). The definitions go beyond the usual classifica-
tion of independent or externally committed directors made by regulators and academic
researchers. In this way, we aim to explain the inconclusive results of past studies that
may have been driven by deficits in variable specifications. Furthermore, this break-
down allows us also to examine which factors really drive board structure-performance
relationships. In addition, the study explicitly deals with the simultaneity problem: firm
performance may affect the independence and the commitment of the board. The paper
considers endogeneity issues using Durbin-Wu-Hausman-tests and applying the two-
stage least squares method (2SLS). After all, our research findings establish whether
investors trust specific types of directors categorized by the extent to which they act in
the shareholders’ best interests.
1 Literature Review
This section reviews the literature on board independence and commitment. Board in-
dependence is associated with the issue of CEO duality4, and the proportion of outsiders
or independent directors on the board. The advantages of board independence are based
on agency theory which stresses the need for monitoring. External board commitment is
justified by resource dependence theory which underlines the need for external links and
the advisory function of the board. The passage on external board commitments includes
studies on board members who concurrently exercise directorships, executive positions
or political posts.
1.1 Board Independence
The effect of board composition (and independence) on firm performance or company pol-
icy (e.g., CEO dismissal) is a researched topic in legal, business, and finance literature.
One-tier boards as in the United States or in Switzerland can consist of executives. How-
ever, so-called insiders have conflicts of interest because their job includes supervising
themselves among other things. Thereby, the proportion of insiders or the extent of CEO
duality is expected to negatively influence firm performance. For this reason, share-
holders, namely institutional investors, favor independent boards: TIAA-CREF, a large
U.S. mutual fund, invests only in firms which have a majority of outside directors, and
CalPERS, a large U.S. pension fund, suggests that the CEO should be the only insider on
a board (see Bhagat and Black, 1999; Coles et al., 2008). Furthermore, some U.S. stock
exchanges such as the NYSE and NASDAQ also require a majority of outside directors;
4Definition: which is the situation when the same person holds both the job of CEO and chairman of
the board of a firm.
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and last but not least, SOX requires independent audit committees.
The most obvious problem associated with board independence concerns the leader-
ship structure of a firm. CEO duality is fervently debated. Dual mandates are widely
argued to have a negative impact on firm performance. Accordingly, Bhagat and Bolton
(2008) demonstrate in an empirical paper that a separation is beneficial for performance.
In contrast, Brickley et al. (1997) find evidence that a separation is detrimental to perfor-
mance, as it is value-decreasing, and both Baliga et al. (1996) and Schmid and Zimmer-
mann (2008) show that neither the stock price nor performance is affected by a change
in the leadership structure. Faleye (2007) explains these results by arguing that the
benefits of a separation depend on CEO and firm characteristics.
More generally, research on board independence concerns the composition of the
board with outside or independent directors. These types of directors are either non-
executive directors or independent directors who have no links at all to the firm except for
their seat on the board. Outsiders are expected to be more likely to protect the sharehold-
ers’ interests than insiders would. As evidence of this theory, Weisbach (1988) finds that
CEOs of poorly performing firms are more frequently removed by outsider-dominated
boards than by insider-dominated boards. In an event-study approach, Rosenstein and
Wyatt (1990) find that the announcement of the appointment of outsiders onto the board
is met with a positive market response from 1981 to 1985. However, in a subsequent
paper, they find a positive market reaction to the appointment of insiders if they own
between 5 and 25 percent of the company stock (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997). Further-
more, Yermack (1996) finds a negative relationship between outsiders and Tobin’s Q in
OLS regressions and fixed effects models. Also Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) show that
outsiders are negatively related to Tobin’s Q in a simultaneous equations framework.
Anderson and Reeb (2004) underline the perception that independent directors repre-
sent minority shareholders’ interests. In balancing family and minority interests, inde-
pendent directors add value to family firms and limit the family’s opportunity to extract
private benefits of control. However, Bhagat and Black (1999) find a negative relation-
ship with firm performance ignoring such issues (i.e., firm characteristics). Both Bhagat
and Black (2002) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find no correlation with long-term per-
formance, neither does Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) nor Klein (1998) using Tobin’s Q
nor Dalton et al. (1998) in conducting a meta-analysis using 54 empirical studies.
All these studies investigate U.S. data. However, it is important to remember that
empirical results are prone to be influenced by sample firms (e.g., location, industry
affiliation, firm size, etc.) and the period of the study (e.g., before or after the introduction
of SOX). In addition, in the rest of the world, the ownership structure is usually more
concentrated. For instance, Lefort and Urzúa (2008), Choi et al. (2007), and Prevost et al.
(2002) all find a positive relationship between outsiders and firm performance in Chile,
Korea, and New Zealand, respectively. And both Erickson et al. (2005) and Beiner et al.
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(2006) find no relationship using a Canadian and Swiss sample, respectively.
1.2 Directors with External Commitments
The external commitments of directors are the mandates that directors hold outside the
board. Expressed in terms of market economics, there is a growth in directors’ exter-
nal commitments or mandates where there is a seller’s market for directorships. Fama
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that reliable — "good" — supervisors and
managerial talent may be rewarded with directorships. However, directors with nu-
merous external mandates may have insufficient time for their board duties owing to
over-commitment.
Fich and Shivdasani (2007) find supporting evidence for this view. They reveal that
the number of additional directorships that a director has declines if the firm faces share-
holder class action lawsuits following financial fraud. Cai et al. (2009) show that share-
holders punish lazy directors. Their results indicate that directors are elected by large
majorities with voting rights in excess of 90 percent in general. In contrast, incumbent
directors who attend fewer meetings receive fewer votes (- 14 percent) at general meet-
ings.
Most empirical studies on multiple directorships find that there is a negative relation-
ship with firm performance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) define so-called "busy boards"
as being composed of a majority of outside directors holding three or more directorships.
Their results indicate that such boards are negatively related to profitability and market-
to-book ratios; additionally, CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is lower, as
well. Also, Jiraporn et al. (2008) find that directors holding multiple board seats nega-
tively affect firm value. In contrast, Ferris et al. (2003) find no evidence that externally
committed directors serve less responsibly and therefore reject policies limiting the num-
ber of externally held directorships.
Again, the prevalence of multiple directorships and interlocking directorships is a
consequence of the structure of an economy.5 Studies addressing the issue outside the
United States have been conducted in Australia (Kiel and Nicholson, 2006), Chile (Silva
et al., 2006), Italy (Di Pietra et al., 2008), the Netherlands (Non and Franses, 2007),
and Switzerland (Loderer and Peyer, 2002; Ammann et al., 2005). In these studies, the
relationship between externally committed directors and firm performance is positive
5Some countries depict a high intensity of cross-shareholdings. Interlocking generally occurs when
two or more directors share board memberships; i.e., a director of firm A sits on the board of firm B and
a director of firm B sits on the board of firm A. However, this strategy is not prevalent in Switzerland.
Nevertheless, there are some exceptions: Walter Kielholz and Thomas Bechtler both sit on the boards of
"Credit Suisse" and "Swiss Re". The same is true for André Kudelski and Claude Smadja ("Edipresse" /
"Kudelski") and Werner Henrich and André Mueller ("Addex" / "Actelion"). Furthermore, the boards of
"Bank Coop" and "Basler Kantonalbank" are quite similar, because "Basler Kantonalbank" partly owns
"Bank Coop" (sharing 66.7 percent of voting rights with Coop).
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in Chile and Italy, negative in the Netherlands and Switzerland, while no relationship
is found in Australia. These studies directly link the number of directorships to firm
performance, suggesting, for instance, that time constraints translate into lower firm
valuation.
Nevertheless, one important question is how multiple directorships affect firm per-
formance. An external board members’ over-commitment may be indirectly correlated
with firm performance. As examples, Jiraporn et al. (2008) and Ahn et al. (2010) find
higher diversification and empire-building tendencies if board members are overly com-
mitted externally. Both strategies are perceived as value-decreasing activities. Yermack
(2006) demonstrates that stock price effects due to major events in one company are
transmitted to other companies that share the same director.
There are some types of director that are more common in board rooms. Politicians,
for example, belong to the usual suspects occupying board seats. While the business
skills of such directors may often be questionable, they can, nevertheless, open useful
channels to the government’s funds and legislators. Recurrent findings illustrate that
regulated firms have more directors with a background in politics (Agrawal and Knoe-
ber, 2001; Helland and Sykuta, 2004; Hillman, 2005). Hillman (2005) shows that the
fraction of politicians on the board positively affects performance in regulated and un-
regulated firms. Even though, the effect is stronger in regulated firms. Finally, Goldman
et al. (2009) find positive announcement effects of the nomination of politically-connected
directors if they are linked to the dominant political party.
Executives, especially CEOs, are other candidates for directorships. According to
Lorsch and MacIver (1989), managers know best how to optimally monitor managers.
However, some corporate governance codes recommend a maximum number of director-
ships for executives and CEOs are less likely to serve on boards today than 10 years
ago (see Spencer Stuart, 2010).6 One notorious problem again is the constraint on time,
because CEO positions are demanding and time-consuming. Conyon and Read (2006)
argue that executives will accept a larger number of external appointments than is op-
timal for their primary employer. Additionally, conflicts can also occur where directors
represent interests of both supply and demand.
Nevertheless, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) prove that inside directors with outside di-
rectorships are positively related to market-to-book ratios and operating performance. In
addition, event-studies show that the market reaction on the appointment of CEOs (Fich,
2005) and executives from sender firms with low agency problems (Perry and Peyer,
2005) is positive. In contrast, Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) do not find any positive effect of
CEOs on firm performance. Their results depict a negative effect if it is an interlocking
6In Germany, corporate managers should not have more than three supervisory board seats from listed
corporations (RDCGK, 2010). In France, executives should not have more than four outside directorships
(AFEP-MEDEF, 2008).
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CEO.
In summary, while provisions for independent boards have been launched by in-
vestors and regulators, the empirical evidence supporting board-performance effects is
mixed, whether it is concerned with CEO duality or the proportion of independent direc-
tors on the board (Schmid and Zimmermann, 2008; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). With re-
spect to directors’ external commitments, our literature review shows that most studies
find a negative relationship between the number of directorships and firm performance
(Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Jiraporn et al., 2008). In contrast, the presence of politicians
and inside directors with external directorships on boards seems to be value-enhancing
(Hillman, 2005; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011). This supports the notion that the board
can consist of various types of directors. The optimal composition of the board may not
be equal for every firm, thus calling for a consideration of individual firm characteris-
tics. Baysinger and Butler (1985) suggest that various types of directors execute distinct
functions on boards. They categorize directors’ functions into three board categories: in-
siders carry out executive functions, independent directors act in a monitoring capacity,
and other directors are instrumentally engaged in providing legal counsel.
2 Data Description and Definition of Variables
The Directive on Information Relating to Corporate Governance from the SIX Swiss Ex-
change requires all listed corporations to disclose relevant information about their direc-
tors (SIX Exchange, 2008).7 This information includes a curriculum vitae, an outline of
the director’s position vis-à-vis the firm, and a list of their external professional activi-
ties.8 The detailed data provides the basis for this study.
2.1 Data
All firms of the Swiss Performance Index (SPI) with complete annual reports in 2008
excluding "investment companies" and "financial services" were targeted. Therefore, the
selection bias is negligible (except that non-listed firms are excluded). The sample thus
consists of 197 firms whose annual reports enabled us to hand-collect data on 1,399 di-
rectors. Cross-checking the data of directors who hold directorships in two or more listed
companies reveals that not all annual reports disclose the same information. The de-
7http://www.six-exchange-regulation.com/download/admission/being_public/governance/
scbp_en.pdf (access on 05/04/2010).
8"Other activities and functions; For each member of the board of directors: (a) Activities in governing
and supervisory bodies of important Swiss and foreign organizations, institutions and foundations under
private and public law; (b) Permanent management and consultancy functions for important Swiss and
foreign interest groups; (c) Official functions and political posts." (see SIX Directive 3.2) (SIX Exchange,
2008).
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tails disclosed on multiple directorships varied across firms. Some exceptions restrict
the disclosure to only relevant piece of information; e.g., membership of other listed cor-
porations. In consequence, the data was aligned where possible.
2.2 Firm Performance: Tobin’s Q
We use Tobin’s Q (Q) as a proxy for firm performance. Our Q is calculated as the ratio
of the market value of equity plus book value of total debt to the book value of total
assets (see Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Loderer and Peyer, 2002; Beiner et al., 2006).
The omitted intangible assets in the book value reflect — among other things — the
director competence or investor confidence in the board. In this study, all classes of
equity including non-listed equity classes are used for the calculation of the market value
of equity. Five percent of all firms have two shares listed at the SIX Swiss Exchange and
16 percent of all firms have non-listed equity outstanding. The market value of equity is
the average stock price 15 days around the last trading day in 2007, multiplied by the
number of outstanding shares.
2.3 Independence Variables
Independence variables describe the board’s relation to the firm. As Adams et al. (2010)
point out, outsiders are frequently not really independent, stressing the need to account
for additional variables of board independence. INDEP is the fraction of independent
directors on the board. INDEP defines directors who are neither actual executives (in-
siders) of the firm (EXEC), nor affiliated (or gray) directors. Affiliated directors have
current business relations with the firm (BREL) or were former employees of the firm
(FEXEC). Additional variables are used to classify the board’s independence. LTEN is
the fraction of directors with a tenure longer than six years, since the normal term of
office is usually three years. BLDIR is the fraction of directors with significant share-
holdings (i.e., more than three percent of voting rights). Finally, SHR and FR indicate
the fraction of directors who represent a shareholder or a family, respectively, and not
only themselves identified as "significant shareholders". The leadership structure in-
cludes three dummy variables. CEOC is 1 if the chairman serves also as CEO of the
company (and 0 otherwise), CEOD is 1 if the CEO is an ordinary member of the board
(and 0 otherwise), and CEOB is 1 if one of the two holds (and 0 otherwise).
2.4 External Commitment Variables
External commitment variables describe board-member activities outside the firm. First,
the aggregate of all board directors’ external commitments divided by the number of
board members is labeled NOS. NOLD denotes all directorships or chairmanships in
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companies included in this sample; i.e., all Swiss SPI firms. Second, chairmanships
(NOCOB) and directorships (NOD) measure the number of concurrent board seats some-
one holds. "Various" or "other" directorships are given a value of three and subsidiaries
are not included. Third, management functions outside the board are termed OCEO and
OOFF if the director is also a CEO or an officer of another firm, respectively. Finally, non-
corporate appointments are also defined. MOI identifies membership of interest groups
(e.g., Economiesuisse, chambers of commerce) and MOP are actual or former relations
to government and political activities. CHA is membership of a charity (e.g., foundation,
non-government organization), ADV signifies advisory services (e.g., scientific research
group), and COMM are memberships in commissions (e.g., investment commission).
2.5 Control Variables
There are three areas that potentially influence the optimal structure of the board.
Firstly, the legal environment sets the boundaries. Legal rules determine the leeway
available in structuring the board. This area is covered with the dummy variable LIUS
and equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the United States (and 0 otherwise). For in-
stance, NYSE rules mandate independent directors for certain committees. In addition,
industry fixed effects account for industry regulation (INDUSTRY). Regulation can sub-
stitute internal governance (Kole and Lehn, 1999; Booth et al., 2002). For example, in
Switzerland banking regulation requires a dual-board structure (Swiss Banking Imple-
menting Regulation (of 1972) Art. 8 para. 2 B).
Secondly, the corporate governance environment characterizes the agency problems
within a firm. The way in which ownership is partitioned influences the purpose of the
board. For instance, the directors appointed to a firm which is controlled — as pre-
dominant outside Anglo-Saxon countries — by one or a coalition of shareholders have
to ensure that minority interests are respected. In this case, the standard stipulations
on the independence of directors may be relaxed and the shareholder may hold con-
trol over the firm’s activities. HHIBLOCK measures ownership concentration with the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.9
Lastly, the operational environment defines the skills needed on the board. Empiri-
cal evidence suggests that large, diversified and complex firms have more independent
boards, while young, fast-growing firms have insider-dominated boards (Boone et al.,
2007; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008; Lehn et al., 2009). Older firms may have
more severe agency problems (e.g., empire building) while more recent firms may benefit
from lower information costs because firm-specific information is more important to them
(Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Raheja, 2005). As a possible consequence, Lehn et al. (2009)
9If the index is 1, then all votes are combined in only one voting block, and if the index is 0, then there
is no voting block at all.
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do not find any robust correlation between board composition and firm performance if
the above determining factors are included as control variables.
The operational environment includes firm growth and is denoted SGR. SGR is the
growth rate in net annual sales from 2006 to 2007. Diversification is denoted DIVER
and equals 1 if the company has more than one business segment (and 0 otherwise). The
corporate center as a business segment is excluded. According to Anderson et al. (2000),
diversified firms have more outside directors. IPO is 1 if the IPO was within the last 10
years (and 0 otherwise). For instance, Baker and Gompers (2003) present evidence that
venture-backed IPO firms have outsider-oriented boards. Finally, INDUSTRY reflects
different growth opportunities and competition that influence Tobin’s Q (an alternative
variable for growth opportunities such as "R&D expenditure" is not available for a host of
firms, especially in the financial sector). Furthermore, the level of corporate governance
differs among industries relating also to the internationalization of the corresponding
industries (see Beiner et al., 2004).
2.6 Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis
Table I provides descriptive statistics of the variables applied in this study. The first
set of variables, the "independence variables", depicts that, on average, three quarters
of the board members are independent, and 11 percent are executive directors. Both,
former executives and directors with business relations make up around 7.5 percent
of the directorships. Hence, affiliated (or gray) directors account for 15 percent of all
directorships. The second set of variables, the "external commitment variables", presents
the average number of mandates per director. In the mean board, each director has 3.366
external appointments (all mandates), but only 0.387 in boards of the sample companies
(i.e., SPI firms). Hence, such directorships represent about 18 percent of all directorships
(=NOLD/(NOCOB+NOD)). Politicians make up around 12 percent of all directorships,
external CEOs about 17 percent, and other external executives 22 percent.
Univariate analysis using ordinary least squares (OLS) with Tobin’s Q and indepen-
dence and external commitment variables is displayed on the right-hand side of the sum-
mary statistics. Most importantly, the results show that board independence (INDEP)
and external commitments (NOS) are significantly negatively correlated with Q. These
relationships are also illustrated in Figure 1. The chart indicates that Tobin’s Q is higher
for firms in the lowest percentile group of both INDEP and NOS than for firms in the
highest group.
However, more precise definitions of independence and external commitments reveal
that their relations with Tobin’s Q may be driven by other factors: CEOs as ordinary
directors (CEOB) and executive directors (EXEC) positively affect firm valuation which
might cause the negative relationship between INDEP and Q. The NOS-Q relationship
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Table I: Descriptive statistics. Summary statistics of the variables in the paper. The basis sample consists
of 197 observations. Abbreviations: d. = director, p. d. = per director, rel. = relations, y. = years, rep. =
representatives, seg. = segment. The table presents mean, median, minimum (Min), maximum (Max), and
standard deviation (SD) for each variable. Q = β(X) is estimated using OLS, INDEP =β(X) is estimated
using fractional logit regressions, and NOS = β(X) is estimated using Tobit regression. White (1980)
standard errors are reported in parantheses and significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent
levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Variable Definition Mean Median Min Max SD
Performance Variable
Q Tobin’s Q 1.81 1.34 0.64 8.48 1.18
Independence Variables Q = β(X)
INDEP Fraction of independent d. 0.74 0.80 0.00 1.00 0.22 -0.828 **
CEOC 1 if CEO is chairman 0.13 — — — 0.33 0.037
CEOD 1 if CEO is director 0.18 — — — 0.39 0.488 *
CEOB 1 if CEO is board member 0.31 — — — 0.46 0.360 *
EXEC Fraction of executive d. 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 1.195 **
FEXEC Fraction of former executive d. 0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.452
BREL Fraction of d. with business rel. 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.13 0.028
LTEN Fraction of d. with tenure >6 y. 0.44 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.29 -0.109
BLDIR Fraction of blockholding d. 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.786
SHR Fraction of shareholder rep. 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.20 -0.449
FR Fraction of family rep. 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.448
External commitment Variables
NOS Number of mandates p. d. 3.37 3.14 0.33 10.89 1.67 -0.112 ***
NOLD Number of sample mandates p.d. 0.39 0.33 0.00 1.60 0.36 -0.142
NOCOB Number of chairmanships p. d. 0.54 0.43 0.00 4.00 0.51 -0.196
NOD Number of directorships p. d. 1.63 1.43 0.00 5.29 1.03 -0.070
OCEO Other CEO employment p. d. 0.17 0.14 0.00 1.25 0.18 -0.960 ***
OOFF Other officer employment p. d. 0.22 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.21 -0.913 ***
MOI Member of interest group p. d. 0.23 0.14 0.00 1.50 0.29 -0.488 *
MOP Member of political group p. d. 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.17 -1.004 **
CHA Member of charity p. d. 0.30 0.17 0.00 2.89 0.42 -0.307 **
ADV Advisory services p. d. 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.23 0.499
COMM Member of a commission p. d. 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.33 0.12 -1.160
Q = β(X) is estimated using OLS estimates with robust White (1980) standard errors.
Mean Median SD
Control Variables INDEP =β(X) NOS = β(X)
HHIBLOCK Ownership concentration 0.21 0.12 0.24 0.279 0.936 *
SGR Growth in net annual sales 0.19 0.10 0.63 -0.195 *** -0.022
DIVER 1 if more than one business seg. 0.68 – 0.47 0.019 -0.106
IPO 1 if IPO in the last ten years 0.31 – 0.47 -0.304 * -0.546 **
LIUS 1 if U.S. exchange listed 0.05 – 0.22 0.254 1.218 ***
INDUSTRY 14 Industry fixed effects – – – – –
INDEP = β(X) is estimated using fractional logit regression with robust White (1980) standard errors.
NOS = β(X) is estimated using Tobit regression with robust White (1980) standard errors.
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Figure 1: Comparison of Board Independence and External Commitments with Tobin’s Q
seems not be significantly driven by directorships (NOCOB and NOD). However, external
executives (OCEO and OOFF) are negatively related to Q. The same is true for member-
ships in interest groups (MOI) and charities (CHA) or political affiliations (MOP). Nev-
ertheless, such comparisons have severe omitted-variables problems that cause severe
heterogeneity and endogeneity issues, since they ignore firm characteristics.
The coefficients of the control variables for the two main explanatory variables IN-
DEP and NOS are estimated using fractional Logit regression for INDEP and Tobit re-
gressions for NOS, left-censored at 0 (see Papke and Wooldridge, 1996; Tobin, 1958).10
Interestingly, the results do not emphasize the notion that monitoring is stressed by gov-
ernance (HHIBLOCK) and legal issues (LIUS) or that advising needs are associated with
external knowledge (SGR and DIVER), assuming that HHIBLOCK describes the agency
structure and LIUS the legal environment. However, the results do suggest that all con-
trol variables apart from DIVER influence the variables of interest. However, DIVER is
expected to influence Q.
As already discussed, the call for independent directors may have led to directors
combining external activities. For this reason, a correlation matrix is set up in order to
find patterns between these two sets of variables (see Appendix Table XI). The correla-
tions are based on board averages. The table shows that variables that account for non-
independence such as EXEC or BLDIR are mostly negatively correlated with external
commitment variables (NOLD, NOD, OCEO, MOI and MOI, MOP, CHA, respectively).
In contrast, external commitment variables are mostly positively interrelated (e.g., NO-
10OLS is not applicable if the dependent variable is a fraction like INDEP and consequently lies between
0.0 (= 0 percent) and 1.0 (= 100 percent) (0≤INDEP≤1) and OLS is not applicable if the dependent variable
is censored. NOS is censored at 0 because not less than 0 mandates can be observed (NOS≥0).
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COB and NOD, OCEO or CHA and MOI, MOP). These findings may suggest that two
different board types exist in Switzerland. On the one hand, there are independent
boards whose directors are committed externally. On the other hand, there are boards
whose directors are internal executives (insiders), but who do not take on any external
commitments. Both types may be a reaction to the firm’s circumstances. In its simplest
case, the principal shareholders, the directors, and the executive board overlap largely.
2.7 One-tier Versus Two-tier Boards
Two examples highlight the scope of governance: 4M Technologies Holding (today branded
as Perfect Holding), an optical disc supplier, is in the control of the Grey family, who own
30 percent of the voting rights in 2007. Nicolas and Stephan Grey sit on the three-
member board, while Stephan Grey is chairman and CEO. These directors have one out-
side appointment on average. In contrast to this example, the board of Zurich Financial
Services, one of the world’s largest insurance groups, comprised 10 members in 2007. No
member holds or held an executive position within the corporation, nor have they had
business relations with the firm. Furthermore, Zurich has no major shareholder owning
more than three percent of the voting rights, but the average number of external man-
dates per director is 4.7. Described in legal terms, the first type of board can be described
as one-tiered, while the second one is structured as a real supervisory board (two-tier).
Hence, one-tier boards and two-tier boards may have varying tasks and objectives.
Table II compares all one-tier and two-tier boards in respect to independence, exter-
nal commitments, and firm characteristics using t-tests for differences in means and
Wilcoxon-test for differences in medians. One-tier boards have at least one executive
director on the board. Two-tier boards are defined as boards which have no executive
directors on the board at all. Hence, as might be expected, the former board type has a
lower rate of independence. The latter type has a higher fraction of former executives. In
respect to external commitments, directors of two-tiered boards are indeed more heavily
engaged. In addition, one-tier boards are smaller, have a longer tenure, and higher board
ownership. Surprisingly, firm characteristics are almost equally distributed. However,
sales growth and Tobin’s Q is significantly higher for one-tier boards.
Also personal characteristics differ between executive directors and non-executive di-
rectors. Table III presents statistical evidence that executive directors are younger and
more likely to be foreigners than non-executive directors. In contrast, and confirming
the results from before, non-executive directors have statistically significantly more en-
gagements in other boards and other functions in general.
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Table II: The table presents comparisons between one-tiered and two-tiered boards. The equality of means
is tested using a Welch Two Sample t-test and the equality of medians is tested using a Wilcoxon rank sum
test with continuity correction. Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels is indicated
by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Board structure
one-tier two-tier
Obs 91 106 t-test/
% 46.19 53.81 (Wilcoxon-test)
Independence (in %)
CEO on board (1=yes, 0=no) 67.03 0.00 *** / (***)
Independent 62.50 84.78 *** / (***)
Executives 24.74 0.00 *** / (***)
Former executives 5.25 9.53 ** / (***)
Directors with business relations 8.84 6.07 - / (*)
External commitment
Number of mandates (counts) 3.05 3.64 ** / (***)
Number of listed dir. (counts) 0.31 0.46 *** / (***)
Board Characteristics
Board size (counts) 6.63 7.51 ** / (***)
Board tenure (in years) 8.22 7.28 * / (*)
Board ownership (in %) 16.59 7.68 *** / (***)
Number of committees (counts) 2.25 2.73 ** / (**)
Firm characteristics
Ownership (Herfindahl) 19.14 23.49
Sales growth (in %) 29.35 9.84 ** / (***)
Diversified (1=yes, 0=no) 67.03 67.92
IPO (> 10 years) (1=yes, 0=no) 37.36 26.42
U.S. listing (1=yes, 0=no) 6.59 3.77
Tobin’ s Q 1.985 1.658 * / (***)
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Table III: The table presents comparisons between executive directors and non-executive directors boards.
The equality of means is tested using a Welch Two Sample t-test and the equality of medians is tested
using a Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction. Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and
10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
All Executive Non-executive
Directors Directors
Observations 1399 129 1270 t-test /
in % 100.00% 9.22% 90.78% (Wilcoxon-test)
Demographic characteristics
Age (years) 57.32 54.93 57.56 *** / (***)
Gender (1=female, 0=male) (in %) 5.93 3.10 6.22 * / (-)
Nationality (1=foreigner, 0=Swiss) (in %) 25.02 34.11 24.09 ** / (**)
- Swiss (counts) 1034 85 949
- German (counts) 111 11 100
- Other (counts) 254 33 221
External commitment
Number of mandates (counts) 2.847 1.806 2.953 *** / (***)
Number of listed dir. (counts) 2.057 1.271 2.137 *** / (***)
3 Empirical Analysis
Having presented the results of the univariate OLS regressions in the previous chap-
ter, where Q was regressed on only one variable, in this section, all regressions include
control variables as defined in Section 2.5.
3.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Models
Table IV presents the relation between five basic proxies for independence and external
commitment and Tobin’s Q. In addition to INDEP, INDEP_EXT is the fraction of direc-
tors who do not qualify for any variable defined in Section 2.3.11 Additionally to NOS,
NOLD counts only directorships in listed companies. This allows comparisons with other
studies and circumvents a bias in disclosure practice. Furthermore, BUSY is a dummy
variable and equals 1 if at least 50 percent of the outside board members have more than
three directorships as suggested by Fich and Shivdasani (2007). However, none of these
variables is significantly related to Tobin’s Q.
As discussed before, independent boards are likely to be externally committed boards.
In consequence, we now estimate the effects of independence and external commitments
on Tobin’s Q simultaneously. Table IV, Column VI, displays an OLS regression model
where both INDEP and NOS are included. So, in this case the omitted variables prob-
11Specifically, this means that insiders (EXEC), former executives (FEXEC), directors with business
relations (BREL), directors with a long tenure (LTEN) and with significant ownership (BLDIR) are not
independent.
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lem can be reduced. The results show that neither INDEP nor NOS are significantly
related to firm performance. However, estimating both effects in one regression still
does not allow for an interrelation between the two effects — it only controls for each
individually. Furthermore, independence and external commitments are still seen as
exogenously determined. It ignores the endogeneity problem and the fact that all three
variables may be a function of each other, as well.
3.2 Instrumental Variables
There are a number of justifications for investigating board structure-firm performance
relations using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. Technically speaking,
OLS requires exogenous right-hand variables. In this instance, the explanatory vari-
ables (Xi) are determined outside the model and are not correlated with unobserved
characteristics (cov(Xk,i,ui) = 0). In other words, OLS assumes that the regressors’
distribution is uncorrelated (independent) with the distribution of the error term. In
contrast, in the case where one or more regressors are endogenous, the OLS estimator
is biased and inconsistent. Endogeneity occurs in the presence of selection bias, omit-
ted variables bias12, misspecified or erroneous variables, measurement errors, and joint
simultaneity. The last problem arises if the dependent variable affects one or more re-
gressors ("reverse causation") (see Verbeek, 2008).13
Regressions can be made robust to endogeneity using instruments. The instruments
predict each endogenous variable and extract the part that is associated with the error
term. Even though any exogenous variable is an instrument, instruments refer typically
to the excluded exogenous variables. However, the selection of valid instruments is not
trivial. Firstly, the instrument has to be exogenous (independent); i.e., it must not be
correlated with the error term (cov(Zi,ui) = 0). Secondly, the instrument has to be rel-
evant; i.e., it must be (partially) correlated with the endogenous variable conditional on
the other variables (cov(Zi, X i) 6= 0).14
Most commonly, such problems are solved using a system of equations that includes
12Missing and unobserved characteristics (heterogeneity) can lead to spurious correlations. For instance,
firms with independent boards may have totally different features from firms with non-independent
boards, which influences Tobin’s Q. However, in some cases it is difficult to find reasonable proxy vari-
ables.
13As an example of reverse causation, think of a highly valued firm. Such a firm may be attractive
to independent directors, and in addition, this firm may also have privileged resources not need to seek
directors who directly help in dealing with day-to-day business. As a result, a firm with a high Tobin’s Q
may choose a higher level of board independence, and not vice versa. Similar examples can easily be found
for external board commitments where casual links cannot be established.
14So-called "weak instruments" have a low correlation with the endogenous variable; i.e., they explain
only a low variation in the endogenous variable that is not already described by the other exogenous
variables. If the correlation between the instrument and the regressors is low, the standard errors of in-
strumental variables’ estimators are high (Wooldridge, 2010). Hence, an instrument must be significantly
related to the endogenous variable in the reduced form.
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equations for every endogenous variable (first-stage regression or reduced-form equa-
tion), in addition to the "original" equation (second-stage regression) and is estimated
using two-stage least squares (2SLS) or three-stage least squares (3SLS) (see Agrawal
and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008).
The necessary identification condition for a system of simultaneous equations re-
quires that the number of instruments (exogenous variables) excluded in any equation
must be at least as great as the number of endogenous variables included in the equa-
tion minus one ("exclusion restriction"). These exclusions permit the identification of the
system of equations. In other words, every equation needs some individual exogenous
variables.
The relevance of the instrument(s) can be examined by the Wald-test on the sig-
nificance of the additional instrument(s) explaining the endogenous variable that does
or do not appear in the set of control variables.15 For testing endogeneity, we use
the regression-based Durbin-Wu-Hausman auxiliary approach described in Wooldridge
(2010) because it can be made robust to heteroskedasticity in a straightforward way. The
residuals (v2) from the first-stage regression in which the possibly endogenous variable
is regressed on all instruments (including exogenous control variables) is included in the
"original" equation. If the residual-term v2 is statistically significant, then the variable
is not exogenous. Similarly, if a set of variables is expected to be endogenous, a Wald-test
on the set of residuals for joint exogeneity can be used.
In order to allow interrelations and to control for endogeneity, we develop a joint
test for three equations. Our system has 14 explanatory variables of which three are
endogenous (Q, INDEP, NOS) and 11 are exogenous (five act as "real" instruments and
the others are the common exogenous control variables). The necessary condition states
that the number of instruments (Zi) excluded in the array of the exogenous variables
(X i) must be at least as large as the number of endogenous variables in X. So, the iden-
tification of the system of equations requires that at least two exogenous variables must
be excluded from any single equation. We identify five variables as instruments for Q,
INDEP, and NOS.
Equation 1 Q = f1(INDEP, NOS, STMV, control variables, e1)
— incl. endogenous variables: INDEP and NOS
— excl. exogenous variables (or instruments): LAW, ITA, BSIZE, and MUCL
Equation 2 INDEP = f2(Q, NOS, BSIZE, MUCL, control variables, e2)
— incl. endogenous variables: Q and NOS
— excl. exogenous variables (or instruments): LAW, ITA, and STMV
15The Wald-test is a heteroskedasticity-consistent version of the F-test.
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Equation 3 NOS = f3(Q, INDEP, ITA, LAW, control variables, e3)
— incl. endogenous variables: Q and INDEP
— excl. exogenous variables (or instruments): BSIZE, MUCL, and STMV
Two variables are used as instruments for board independence (INDEP): board size
(BSIZE) and multiple classes of equity (MUCL). BSIZE is calculated as the natural log-
arithm of the number of board members. Larger boards offer more seats to be staffed by
independent directors. MUCL is set as 1 if there is more than one equity class outstand-
ing (and 0 otherwise). Two types of shares are issued in order to consolidate the voting
power into one group of shareholder. Thus, the independence of the board may be less
crucial.
Two instruments are also used to determine external commitments (NOS): lawyers
(LAW) and location in the Italian part (ITA). LAW is the fraction of law graduates on
a board. Lawyers usually occupy a support and not strategic function within a board
and are often linked to political groups or other organizations. Therefore, LAW should
positively affect NOS, as they are expected to be active in a number of organizations.
ITA is a spatial dummy variable and equals 1 if the corporation is headquartered in the
Italian part of Switzerland (i.e., canton of Ticino) (and 0 otherwise). This location may be
less attractive for externally committed directors because of its relatively long distance
from the economic centers (e.g., Basel, Geneva or Zurich) and the language (Italian). As
a result, this location may decrease the average number of mandates per director.
Finally, STMV is defined as annual net revenue over firm value. Firm value is defined
as the market value of equity adjusted to free float; i.e., the fraction of equity that is not
owned by blockholders. A high ratio implies that sales are backed by a low equity base
which might involve more risk and therefore negatively influence Tobin’s Q. Please note
that a univariate regression of Tobin’s Q on STMV indicates no significant relationship.
Table V presents two important tests for instruments using Wald-statistics. In Panel
A the relevance of the instruments is examined and the irrelevance of both sets of ex-
cluded instruments is rejected. Durbin-Wu-Hausman-test in Panel B examines the joint
significance of the residuals from the first-stage regressions in the original equation and
the null-hypothesis of joint exogeneity is not rejected.
The results from the estimation of the system of equation using the instrument vari-
ables described before are presented in Table VI. The Sargan test of the overidentifying
restrictions confirms that the instruments chosen are appropriate, i.e., the joint hypoth-
esis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error cannot be rejected.16 Columns
16Sargan test ( χ2) uses the residuals of the 2SLS estimation and regresses them on the instruments.
The generated R2 are then multiplied with the number of observations (N).
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Table V: Instrument Relevance and Test for Endogeneity
Panel A: Relevance of Instruments
Wald-test R2
STMV 8.3589 (***) 0.4329
ln(BSIZE) / MUCL 5.9998 (***) 0.2740
LAW / ITA 3.8443 (**) 0.1970
Wald-test for relevance of the instruments excluded
from the (exogeneous) control variables.
R2 of the first-stage regression.
Panel B: Durbin-Wu-Hausman-test
Wald-test
INDEP / NOS 0.1496
Wald-test for joint exogeneity of the critical variables
I-III show that the results do not change if both INDEP and NOS are estimated in a sys-
tem of equation using OLS. Furthermore, the results remain qualitatively the same if
the system is estimated using 2SLS (see Columns IV-VI). Hence, both INDEP and NOS
are not significantly related to Tobin’s Q whether they are estimated using OLS or 2SLS.
3.3 Independence and External Commitment Re-Examined
In the next step, both independence (INDEP) and external commitment (NOS) are parti-
tioned into sub-variables separately (Table VII and Table VIII). In addition, each model
has been examined to establish whether the functional form is correct using the Wald-
test (§). The tests always compare a restricted (linear) model to a unrestricted (non-
linear) model. Throughout, the more appropriate fit is presented in the tables.
Furthermore, similarly to Table V, on the right-hand side of the tables, Wald-statistics
are presented for the relevance of the excluded instrument, its impact on the seemingly
endogenous variable, and its significance (†) (choice of instruments is not discussed).
Below, we present the Durbin-Wu-Hausman-test results for endogeneity of the regres-
sors (††). Once a variable is identified as not being endogenous, it is included in the set
of instruments in the following test for exogeneity (e.g., EXEC, FEXEC, and BREL in
Column IV of Table VII). Durbin-Wu-Hausman-test uses (robust) t-statistics for single
endogenous variables or Wald-statistics for joint significance of the residuals from the
first-stage regressions. Using this test, none of the explanatory variables seems to be
endogenous.
The "independence models" examine in total 9 different variables that could affect
the independence of the board. Hereby, Table VII, Column I, exhibits a non-linear and
significant U-shaped relationship between the fraction of executive directors (EXEC) and
firm performance. Former executives (FEXEC) or directors with business relationships
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(BREL) are unimportant. The model with all variables that account for independence
explains 47.84 percent of the variation in Tobin’s Q (R2) (Column IV). Besides, in the
full-specified model, the fraction of family representatives (FR) on the board depicts a
positive relationship.
The same procedure as above is conducted for the "external commitment models". The
number of all mandates (NOS) is split into 9 sub-variables. Additionally, the fraction
of executive directors (EXEC) is included as control variable that accounts for internal
commitments. Table VIII, Column I, presents variables that are related to executive ac-
tivities. The evidence demonstrates that, while executive directors (EXEC) are positively
associated with firm performance, executive positions outside the firm depict a negative
relationship (OCEO/OOFF). Seemingly, investors question the due diligence of execu-
tives from firms other than their own. No further insights are generated by regressions
that include directorships (both as chairman (NOCOB) and as ordinary director (NOD))
and influential functions such as membership of interest groups (MOI), political groups
(MOP) or charities (CHA) as well as advisory activities (ADV), and jobs in commissions
(COMM) (Columns II, III, and IV).
3.4 Board activity
As mentioned before, board independence or external commitment may be indirectly
related to Tobin’s Q. The status of board members vis-à-vis the firm and their activities
outside the board room can affect the time committed to the board. Vafeas (1999) reasons
that meetings proxy for internal activity of the board. Jiraporn et al. (2009) show that
directors with external mandates are more frequently absent from meetings than others.
For these reasons and given that independence is a measure of monitoring capacity, it
can be expected that board independence and board activity are positively related. In
contrast, if directors with external commitments do not devote enough time to the board,
this variable should be negatively associated to board activity.
In order to test these questions empirically, we employ Poisson regressions with the
number of all meetings (including committee meetings) or the total hours spent in all
meetings as its dependent variables (BMTGS and BHRS). These are regressed on board
independence with its broadest criteria (INDEP_EXT) and the fraction of executives on
the board (EXEC), in addition to external commitments which consist of all external
mandates (NOS) and external directorships in listed (sample) firms (NOLD). As a control
variable, the number of board committees is employed (NOCO).
Table IX displays summary statistics of meeting variables. In total and on average,
board members met 17.61 times in one year, which gives a total board time of 71.38
hours. In comparison, the number of ordinary board meetings (excluding committee
meetings) is 7.254 on average (median: 6), and the average length of an ordinary meeting
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Table VII: The table presents OLS regression coefficient estimates for board independence. The sample
consists of 197 SPI firm observations in 2008. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (market value of equity
and book value of debt over total assets). EXEC is the fraction of executive directors, FEXEC is the fraction
of former executive directors, and BREL is the fraction of directors with business relations. CEOC is 1 if
the CEO is chairman; CEOD is 1 if the CEO is director; LTEN is the fraction of directors with tenure
longer than 6 years; BLDIR is the fraction of blockholding directors; SHR is the fraction of shareholder
representatives; FR is the fraction of family representatives. ln(BSIZE) is the natural logarithm of board
size; MBA is the fraction of directors holding a MBA degree; PR is the fraction of directors with professioral
status; SINGY is 1 if the term of office is 1 year; FAM is 1 if a blockholder is a family. The intercept and the
control variables from Table IV are not presented to save space. White (1980) standard errors are reported
in parantheses and significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
Independent Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q Instrument
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (Wald-test)†
EXEC -1.75051 (*) -2.05231 ln(BSIZE)
(1.004) (1.400) (5.89 / - / **)
EXEC2 3.51610 (***) 4.19351 (***)
(1.176) (1.400)
CEOC -0.21881 MBA
(0.298) (5.34 / - / **)
CEOD 0.25780 PR
(0.251) (8.90 / - / ***)
FEXEC 0.66372 0.68348 MBA
(0.599) (0.668) (4.06 / + / **)
BREL -0.59497 -0.25673 SINGY
(0.625) (0.583) (6.37 / + / **)
LTEN 0.27369 SINGY
(0.269) (4.10 / - / **)
BLDIR -0.23689 ln(BSIZE)
(0.631) (10.74 / - / ***)
SHR -0.00065 ln(SALES)
(0.392) (8.03 / - / ***)
FR 1.11877 (**) FAM
(0.556) (65.36 / + / ***)
Control Variables included included included included
Wald-test§ 8.93240 (***) 0.09910 2.63450 0.93860
DWH-test†† 0.61980 -0.91920 -1.50210 0.85270
Multiple R2 0.44870 0.42390 0.42300 0.47840
Adjusted R2 0.38260 0.35850 0.35750 0.38780
† Wald-statistics for excluded instrument in the first-stage / sign / significance
§ Wald-test for functional form: restricted vs. unrestricted model (i.e., non-linear)
†† Durbin-Wu-Hausman: (robust) t-statistics in Columns I, II, III and
Wald-statistics for the joint significance of the residuals in Column IV
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Table VIII: The table presents OLS regression coefficient estimates for external commitments. The sam-
ple consists of 197 SPI firm observations in 2008. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (market value of
equity and book value of debt over total assets). EXEC is the fraction of executive directors; NOS is the
number of mandates p. d.; NOCOB is the number of chairmanships p. d.; NOD is the number of director-
ships p. d.; OCEO is another CEO employment p. d. (p. d. denotes per director); OOFF is another officer
employment p. d.; MOI is the membership of interest group p. d.; MOP is the membership of political
groups p. d.; CHA is the membership of charity p. d.; ADV denotes advisory services p. d.; COMM is the
membership of a commission p. d. DR is the fraction of directors holding a doctoral degree; ln(ASSETS)
is the natural logarithm of total assets; CEOD is 1 if the CEO is director; LAW is the fraction of law
graduates on the board; ln(DEBT) is the natural logarithm of total debt; STA is 1 if a blockholder is the
state; R&D is 1 if data on R&D is available; PRI is 1 if a blockholder is a private. The intercept and the
control variables from Table IV are not presented to save space. White (1980) standard errors are reported
in parantheses and significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
Independent Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q Instrument
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (Wald-test)†
EXEC -1.84907 (*) -1.85524 (*)
(1.003) (1.043)
EXEC2 3.29007 (***) 3.28635 (***)
(1.128) (1.230)
OCEO -0.57818 (*) -0.67937 (**) DR
(0.293) (0.329) (5.88 / - / **)
OOFF -0.75677 (**) -0.73367 (*) ln(ASSETS)
(0.372) (0.393) (3.83 / - / *)
NOCOB -0.00048 0.08595 CEOD
(0.163) (0.157) (9.20 / - / ***)
NOD -0.05227 -0.02726 LAW
(0.085) (0.089) (4.58 / + / **)
MOI -0.02517 -0.01959 ln(DEBT)
(0.275) (0.322) (15.09 / + / ***)
MOP 0.26954 -0.10065 STA
(0.474) (0.405) (21.56 / + / ***)
CHA -0.00843 -0.05503 ln(BSIZE)
(0.185) (0.187) (5.29 / + / **)
ADV -0.04326 -0.02661 R&D
(0.479) (0.477) (4.63 / + / **)
COMM -0.59106 -0.33338 PRI
(0.494) (0.428) (3.74 / - / *)
Control Variables included included included included
Wald-test§ 0.06600 0.24130 0.51560 —
DWH-test†† 0.56730 0.14720 1.77890 —
Multiple R2 0.46930 0.42100 0.42350 0.47190
Adjusted R2 0.39870 0.35150 0.34310 0.37650
† Wald-statistics for excluded instrument in the first-stage / sign / significance
§ Wald-test for functional form: restricted vs. unrestricted model (i.e., non-linear)
†† Durbin-Wu-Hausman: Wald-statistics for the joint significance of the residuals in Columns I-III
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Table IX: Summary statistics of meeting variables. The basis sample consists of 155 (or 94) observations.
The table presents mean, median, minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) for each variable. Abbreviations:
d. = director, p. d. = per director. The correlation matrix compares INDEP_EXT, EXEC, NOS, and NOLD.
***, **, and * denote significances on the 0.1, 1, and 5 percent level.
Correlation Matrix
Variable Mean Median INDEP_EXT EXEC NOS NOLD
BMTGS 17.610 15.000
BHRS 71.380 66.500
INDEP_EXT 0.351 0.286 1
EXEC 0.114 0.000 -0.34*** 1
NOS 3.366 3.143 0.17* -0.27*** 1
NOLD 0.387 0.333 0.22** -0.27*** 0.15* 1
NOCO 2.025 2.000
BMTGS = total number of board meetings (incl. committees)
BHRS = total duration of board meetings in hours (incl. committees)
INDEP_EXT = fraction of independent d. (incl. all criteria)
EXEC = fraction of executive d.
NOS = number of mandates p. d.
NOLD = number of mandates in listed firms p. d.
NOCO = number of committees
is 5.522 hours (median: 5). The sample of Vafeas (1999) depicts 7.45 meetings on average.
The results in Table X indicate that executive directors are negatively related to
board frequency and meeting duration, while the number of all mandates, on average,
positively affects the number of meetings, but negatively (insignificantly) affect the du-
ration of all aggregated meetings. This suggests that meetings are not as necessary if
there are more insiders on the board. Insiders may use other opportunities to discuss
the business processes. Furthermore, information may be transmitted more easily be-
tween the management and a board consisting of insiders, which reduces the need for
meetings. The second result may show that directors with external commitments are
highly professional, indicating that they take board work seriously. Their seriousness
may explain the number of mandates they have on average.
4 Conclusions
The independence and external commitments of boards has been the subject of much
empirical research. However, board independence is a vague term to be used as a de-
scriptor for board structure. The same is true for proxies of the board members’ external
commitments. Over the last few years, critics have petitioned to promote an increased
presence of independent directors on boards. Hence, they implicitly state that fewer in-
dependents hamper effective monitoring. In the words of Hermalin and Weisbach (2003),
such commentators believe that boards are out of equilibrium and have to be adjusted
in the shareholders’ interest. Similarly, there is increasing criticism of board members
27
Table X: Board activity. The table presents Poisson regression coefficient estimates for board indepen-
dence and external commitments. The sample consists of 155 (and 94) SPI firm observations in 2008.
BMTGS is the total number of board meetings (including committee meetings) in 2007; BHRS is the total
duration of board meetings in hours (including committee meetings) in 2007. INDEP_EXT is an extended
definition of independent directors using all seven independence criteria; EXEC is the fraction of executive
directors. NOS is the number of mandates per director; NOLD is the number of mandates in sample firms
per director; NOCO is the number of committees.
Independent Dependent Variable
Variables BMTGS BHRS
(I) (II)
(Intercept) 2.44695 (***) 3.79028 (***)
(0.331) (0.169)
INDEP_EXT 0.07343 0.05928
(0.155) (0.167)
EXEC -0.51212 (**) -0.95881 (**)
(0.255) (0.440)
NOS 0.03667 (**) -0.02261
(0.019) (0.028)
NOLD -0.15538 0.14082
(0.104) (0.112)
NOCO 0.20496 (***) 0.22728 (***)
(0.042) (0.047)
McFadden R2 0.18546 0.18835
AIC 1006.7 1586.2
with multiple mandates. These two issues are further complicated in that they appear
to be interrelated. The call for independent directors has led to a growth in the number
of ’professional’ (outside) directors holding board positions.
We find that neither independence is positively related to Tobin’s Q nor that exter-
nal commitments are negatively related to it. Nevertheless, specific definitions of in-
dependence and external commitments do indicate significant relations. For instance,
the relationship of internal firm executives to company performance is U-shaped, while
executives outside of the firm negatively affect Tobin’s Q. Also representatives of family
shareholders increase firm value. Thus, investors trust these directors more, which, in
turn, results in higher firm valuation. Moreover, the frequency and duration of meetings
is negatively affected by insiders.
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.1 Directors in Switzerland
Directors of large firms are usually some of the most influential citizens in the society.
Directors with multiple directorships are usually older, outsiders, consultants, bankers
or executives, have previously held more powerful positions, and sit on larger boards of
larger corporations (Ferris et al., 2003). The amount of networking between directors is
country-specific and depends to some extent on the ownership structure of the economy.
One special feature of Switzerland as a small open economy is its high concentration of
large global corporations.
Switzerland’s business network used to be very closed in the past. The so-called
"old boys network" operated through business associations, societies, interest groups,
political affiliations, and the Swiss Army. Famous examples of business leaders include
Fritz Gerber, Rainer E. Gut, and Ulrich Bremi. Later, a new group of connected direc-
tors appeared with the likes of Rolf Hüppi, Andres Leuenberger, and Lukas Mühlemann
(Schletti, 2006) (for more information see footnote).17 Nowadays, important business
leaders are less active in politics. However, many politicians are members of politically
influenced boards in the utilities and health industry sectors (see Fritschi, 2009).
However, this transformation occurred over the last two decades. The average board
size decreased from 15 to 10 board members, precipitating a fall in the number of rela-
tionships from 105 to 45.18 Moreover, Swiss directors have been replaced by directors
from abroad to some extent. In 1988, 87 percent of all board members were Swiss males,
while in 2007 this number shrank to 50 percent (Volonté, 2007). So, even though some
directors are very active today, the network intensity cannot be compared to 20 years
ago. Further statistical features underline this perception. In 2008, 1,574 director seats
were shared with 1,349 directors. Hence, the ratio of seats to directors is 86 percent. In
comparison, this ratio was 91 percent for SMI firms in 2007 (and 73 percent in 1988)
(Volonté, 2007). Table XII shows the most important directors in 2008 with regard to
unified market capitalization, compensation, and directorships. In comparison, Swiss
GDP was around CHF 521,101M in 2007.
17Mr. Gerber was CEO and chairman of two blue chip companies between 1988 and 1991 (Zurich and
Roche); Mr. Gut was director of six (!) blue chip firms simultaneously from 1988 to 1992; Mr. Bremi was
director at Credit Suisse (1988 - 1998), director at Elektrowatt and Georg Fischer (both 1988), and Swiss
Re (1992 - 1999). Further, he was national council (Free Democratic Party, FDP) from 1973 until 1991;
Mr. Hüppi was was director at Bankverein (1994 - 1997), CEO of Zurich Financial Services (1991 - 2001;
director of Zurich Financial Services between 1993 - 2001); Mr. Leuenberger was director at Givaudan
(2000 - 2007), Roche (1988 - 2003), Swissair (1998 - 2000), and Swiss Life (1998 - 2002); Mr. Mühlemann
was CEO of Swiss Re (1994 - 1996) and director of Swiss Re (1994 - 2001), CEO of Credit Suisse (1997 -
2002 / CEO and director between 2000 and 2002) and director of Swissair (1998 - 2000).
18A board of 15 seats implicates 105 ([n * (n-1)] / 2) inter-relationships, whereas 10 directors on average
imply 45 relationships.
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.2 Legal Aspects: Accountability and Liability
Legal aspects affect the director’s independence and his or her scope for external com-
mitments. The Swiss Code of Obligations (SCO), the Swiss company law, outlines the
general legal fiduciary duties of the board of directors (SCO Art. 716a).19 The highest
level of a firm’s decision-making authority is assigned to the board of directors; however,
the board can delegate its operating business — but not strategic decisions and other
non-delegable duties — to an executive board (SCO Art. 716b 1). This implies that a
firm is free to choose between a one-tiered or two-tiered board structure, and the CEO
and chairman positions must not be separated. So, the board is responsible for an ad-
equate composition of the management board. Chairmen are important, because they
usually have the the casting vote in majority voting of the board (SCO Art. 713 1), and
they are commonly closest to the daily business (SCO Art. 715a 3 & 4).
According to the SCO (SCO Art. 717), directors are obliged to follow the fiduciary
duties in the best interests of the corporation with the "duty of care" ("Sorgfaltspflicht",
i.e., strict monitoring), the "duty of loyalty" ("Treuepflicht", i.e., no self-dealing) and in
"good faith". The SCO does not specify what legal standard of good faith is assumed.
Nevertheless, violating good faith can lead to personal monetary liability. An inten-
tional ("vorsätzlich") or (grossly) negligent act ("fahrlässiges Handeln") is usually sub-
ject to civil liability (SCO Art. 754 1). Criminal liability is triggered by an intentional
or (grossly) negligent, criminal misconduct such as peculation or misappropriation, ag-
gravated unfair management (Swiss Criminal Code (SCC) Art. 158), money laundering
(SCC Art. 305bis), corruption (SCC Art. 322), insider trading (SCC Art. 161), fraud
(SCC Art. 146) in general or falsification of documents (SCC Art. 251).20 Hence, an
ex-post poor company strategy such as in the case of Swissair in 2001 is not subject to a
violation of the fiduciary duties. As in the United States, the business judgment rule is
commonly applied in the case of shareholder actions (Kunz, 2010). And today, companies
can insure their corporate directors against the financial consequences of litigation (see
Daeniker, 2009).
Directors must have the requisite capacity and skill to fulfill their function, and must
devote the necessary time and effort to the discharge of their duties. So, from a judicial
point of view, insufficient effort, skills or time do not release directors from their duty
of care. This suggests that individuals with multiple board seats encounter danger of
violating good faith. However, the independence criterion of corporate governance codes
19Besides, the board is liable to the firm’s articles of incorporation, the firm’s regulation of the board and
industry regulation (e.g., banking law), etc.
20Fraud can include creative accounting as in the cases of Enron and WorldComm (the two most widely
cited cases of failure in corporate governance) which were investigated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), a government agency and finally lead to SOX in 2002. This liability is personal and
has thus to be examined for every director individually (SCO Art 754 para. 1).
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encourages professional directors. The criterion prescribes that directors must only act
within the contractual obligations to the company. Further financial or personal rela-
tions are not permitted. As a consequence, directors seek other external commitments
assuming that a directorship is generally not a full-time job. In addition, U.S. courts
consider board independence in shareholder lawsuits in order to evaluate the conflict of
interests of directors in relation to the duty of loyalty (see Gordon, 2007). The petition to
employ a greater proportion of external professionals on company boards has two poten-
tially negative and linked consequences for the commitments of such directors. Multiple
mandates lead to insufficient time and there is a trade-off between accountability and
independence. Conversely, a sole directorship is subject to wage-dependence and may
therefore not raise sensible issues in order to retain his or her position on the board for
financial reasons.
In short, prescriptive legislation imposes serious responsibilities on directors and
defines the public expectation of their performance. Directors need know-how, time, and
independence to fulfill their duties. Lipton (2007) doubts whether it is possible for public
companies to attract good board members to serve as directors in the future as a result
of the high personal risk involved: The duties of board members have shifted away from
monitoring and advising to due diligence and compliance duties since the introduction of
the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002.
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A Tables
A.1 Tables
Table XI: Correlation matrix. This table shows Pearson’s correlation matrix between independence and
external commitment variables. The sample consists of 197 observations. ***, **, and * denote signifi-
cances at the 0.1, 1, and 5 percent level.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 INDEP 1
2 CEOC -0.19** 1
3 CEOD -0.20** -0.18* 1
4 EXEC -0.66*** 0.39*** 0.30*** 1
5 FEXEC -0.36*** -0.14 -0.09 -0.20** 1
6 BREL -0.57*** -0.02 0.05 0.09 -0.05 1
7 LTEN -0.11 0.14 -0.01 0.1 0.11 0 1
8 BLDIR -0.38*** 0.20** 0.03 0.39*** 0.14* 0.04 0.09 1
9 SHR 0.05 -0.08 -0.09 0.04 -0.11 -0.05 -0.1 -0.21** 1
10 FR -0.01 0.14* -0.11 0.07 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 0.23** -0.22** 1
11 NOS 0.22** 0 -0.13 -0.27*** -0.22** 0.17* -0.22** -0.17* 0.01 0.07
12 NOLD 0.23** -0.15* -0.07 -0.27*** 0.1 -0.16* -0.07 -0.09 -0.14* 0.04
13 NOCOB 0.07 0.09 -0.20** -0.14 -0.13 0.18* -0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.1
14 NOD 0.14* -0.03 0 -0.19** -0.14* 0.13 -0.20** -0.09 -0.03 0.11
15 OCEO 0.09 -0.02 -0.11 -0.17* 0 0.11 -0.11 -0.07 0.1 0.14*
16 OOFF 0.1 0.07 0.05 -0.13 -0.08 0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.11
17 MOI 0.24*** -0.07 -0.11 -0.21** -0.1 -0.05 -0.09 -0.19** 0.04 0
18 MOP 0.13 0 -0.12 0 -0.21** -0.02 0.04 -0.15* 0.20** -0.11
19 CHA 0.09 -0.06 -0.09 -0.13 -0.1 0.1 -0.15* -0.19** 0.02 -0.09
20 ADV 0.06 0 -0.02 -0.09 -0.08 0.08 -0.11 -0.07 -0.14 0.01
21 COMM 0.06 0.09 -0.05 0.02 -0.09 -0.05 0.09 -0.14 0.04 -0.04
Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
11 NOS 1
12 NOLD 0.15* 1
13 NOCOB 0.60*** 0.04 1
14 NOD 0.80*** 0.23*** 0.29*** 1
15 OCEO 0.19** 0.01 0.32*** 0.03 1
16 OOFF 0.13 -0.21** 0.01 0.02 -0.03 1
17 MOI 0.47*** 0.08 0.18* 0.17* 0.07 -0.04 1
18 MOP 0.27*** -0.14* 0.16* 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.20** 1
19 CHA 0.50*** 0.08 0.14* 0.17* -0.07 -0.02 0.39*** 0.20** 1
20 ADV 0.23** 0.02 0.01 0.11 -0.1 -0.05 0.02 0 0.12 1
21 COMM 0.18* -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.12 0.17* 0.09 0.18** 0.02
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Table XII: Important directors in 2007. This table presents statistics on individual directors. Panel A
shows the top 10 directors concerning accumulated market value. Panel B shows the top 10 earning
directors. Panel C shows directors with 4 or more directorships in listed Swiss firms of this sample. Pos.
is the ranking of the director; Dir. denotes Directorships; G. Gender; Nat. Nationality; and NA is not
available. The figures are influenced by very large corporations (market values) such as Nestlé: CHF
204,398M, Roche: CHF 171,501M, and Novartis: CHF 162,820M.
Panel A: Top 10 Directors in Combined Market Value (CHF in Millions)
Pos. Dir. Market Value Firms Name Age G. Nat.
1 3 455,045 Nestlé, Crédit Suisse, Roche Brabeck-L., P. 63 M A
2 2 234,193 Nestlé, Swiss Re Villiger, K. 66 M CH
3 2 212,353 Nestlé, Logitech Borel, D. 57 M CH
4 3 206,120 Nestlé, Kudelski, Edipresse Kudelski, A. 47 M CH
5 3 195,721 Novartis, Holcim, Nationale S. von Planta, A. 52 M CH
6 2 191,890 Novartis, Syngenta Landolt, P. 59 M CH
7 2 181,395 Roche, Swiss Life Gehrig, B. 61 M CH
8 2 180,590 Roche, Schindler Baschera, P. 57 M I / CH
9 2 179,433 Roche, Givaudan Hoffmann, A. 49 M CH
10 2 119,205 UBS, SGS Marchionne, S. 55 M I / CAN
Panel B: Top 10 Directors in Combined Compensation (CHF in Millions)
Pos. EX. Comp. Firms Name Age G. Nat.
1 1 17.839 Petroplus Lavinia, R. J. NA M US
2 0 17.517 Credit Suisse, Swiss Re Kielholz, W. B. 56 M CH
3 1 17.037 Novartis Vasella, D. 53 M CH
4 1 11.081 Richemont Platt, N. 60 M D
5 1 10.626 EFG International Cuoni, J. P. 70 M CH
6 1 10.295 Richemont Rupert, J. 57 M SA
7 1 9.030 Roche Humer, F. B. 61 M A / CH
8 1 7.700 Syngenta Pragnell, M. 61 M UK
9 1 7.082 Banque Pr. E. Rothschild Alexandre, J. 66 M UK
10 1 6.776 Pargesa Frère, A. NA M B
Note: EX.: executive director (yes = 1, no = 0); Comp.: Compensation.
Only Walter B. Kieholz holds two directorships and is the only non-executive.
Panel C: Directors with 4 or More Directorships in Swiss Listed Firms
Dir. Firms Name Age G. Nat.
5 Bucher, Credit Suisse, Conzzeta, Sika, Swiss Re Bechtler, T. W. 58 M CH
5 AdvalTech, Nationale S., Petroplus, Quadrant, Sika Grüebler, W. 65 M CH
4 Adecco, Allreal, Rieter, Swiss Re Baer, J. 63 M CH
4 Implenia, Jelmoli, Petroplus, Swissquote Dennler, M. 51 M CH
4 BEKB, Givaudan, Jungfraubahnen, Ypsomed Kappeler, P. 60 M CH
4 Allreal, Calida, Micronas, SEZ Lustenberger, T. 56 M CH
4 Burckhardt Comp., Comet, Geberit, Schaffner Hess, H. 52 M CH
4 Georg Fischer, Forbo, Kardex, SPS Huber, R. 52 M CH
4 Allreal, Micronas, Orrell Füssli, Panalpina Hug, R. W. 63 M CH
4 Lenz. Bergb., Inficon, Kühne&Nagel, Siegfried Staehelin, T. 60 M CH
4 Julius Baer, Sika, Sulzer, Vögele Sauter, D. J. 50 M CH
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